Beams will be transferred from SPS to LHC through two transfer lines. each of over 2.5 km length, equipped with conventional resistive magnets with relatively small apertures. Beam energy densities will be roughly 4 orders of magnitude above the LHC quench limit and about one order above damage level. Possible failures of the various elements in the transfer lines and the SPS machine are discussed, together with results from tracking studies. The benefit from installing protection devices in the transfer lines is discussed, along with related layout aspects and the required protection performance.
INTRODUCTION
Protection devices in the transfer lines should be safe for nominal beam intensities and also survive the impact of beams of ultimate intensities, which will be about SO % above the nominal intensities. Parameters are summarized in Table 1 . The batches are extracted in 4/11 of an SPS turn or 7 . 8 6~~. The damage level for fast losses is about 2 x 10" protons and the quench level in the LHC of the order of lo9 protons [2]. An attenuation by at least a factor of 20 and better by a factor of 100 should be achieved to prevent damage by the injected beam [3].
Primary collimators in the LHC will be set to 6 -7 a at injection and secondary collimators to 7 -8.2 a. This reduces the tertiary halo of the circulating beams to below the quench level at physical apertures (at > 10 a). Wrongly injected b e a m could however do damage before they even arrive at the collimation sections in the LHC.
Cleaning of the injected beams is best done as early as possible. A 'shaving' to 3.5 a (corresponding to less than 0.05 % loss for Gaussian beams) is foreseen in the SPS.
The combined effect of closed orbit errors, SPS extraction and transfer lines ripple and drifts corresponds to an increase by 1.50 [I] . This adds up to a So envelope for the injected beams in the LHC.
Injection steering will be done with low intensity (pilot) beams, well below the damage level. When everything is well adjusted and a pilot circulates in the LHC, the injection of high intensity batches can start.
POSSIBLE FAILURES AND PROTECTION
Protection against mis-firing of the extraction kickers in the SPS is foreseen. The septum MSE which follows the extraction kicker MKE will be protected by the septum di- Most critical is the end of the line with the tight septum (MSI) aperture and the injection region in the LHC. Passive protection for the septum is needed, which at the same time can be used to limit injection oscillations in the LHC. 
OPTICS AND POSSIBLE POSITIONS OF COLLIMATORS
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--3. The optics of the first kilometre of the transfer line TI 8 is shown in Fig. 3 . The beam energy is constant through the transfer line. Momentum collimation can be done in the first available space with high dispersion. The betatron collimation should be able to protect the tight septum aperture and the injection region against any bending errors upstream. It should therefore he placed towards the end of the line. As a first proposal to be looked at more closely, we will follow the following strategy to place collimators 'TCDI" in the transfer line:
Momentum collimation in ttie first available place with large dispersion (which is in the horizontal plane). in this place is relatively large and the horizontal phase advance to the septumnot tca far from 180". Adding also horizontal collimation in this position is considered and would allow to limit the apenure in both planes to reduce losses close to the septum.
PERFORMANCE ESTIMATE
The critical impact parameter b,. below which scattering fromthecollimatoredgeissignificant,is aboutb, = 12pm A result for the least favorable case, in which the beam impacts directly without any blow-up is shown in Fig. 6 . The attenuation based on the r.m.s beam size U = 0.5 mm is then 5 mm/12pm 40. Not all particles scattered back elastically into the beam pipe will be lost in critical places. The scattering angle can be estimated from multiple scattering:
Numerical estimate for graphite: one nuclear interaction length is X % 26 cm and one radiation length Xo = 19 cm.
The effective distance x before absorption is estimated as 2X. The result for the average scattering angle is 00 c 50prad This is about 2 or 3 times more than the beam divergence. It implies that the back-scattered proton losses will be rather distributed. Together with the attenuation of 40 estimated above, there are good reasons to believe that the performance of the transfer line collimators would in fact be sufficient to prevent damage. This should be verified by tracking with simulation of the interactions in the collimators.
The prbposed setting at 5 o at two phases separated by 90" will limit oscillations to below -So at any phase. This still leaves some margin for tolerances up to the LHC physical aperture of about 100 in the LHC.
Whether the momentum collimation at the beginning of the line is really needed will depend on the reliability of the quality checWinterlock system planned for the extraction from the SPS. The passive protection proposed here would reduce the momentum aperture in the line from about *0.8% (estimated with T = *3.2cm aperture and D, = 3.5m dispersion in the transfer line arc) to about AEIE i 0.24 %, as estimated for momentum collimation at D, = 3m, 0, ' i i 100m. 1 o = 1.7mm with a setting at 5 o or 1 8 . 5 mm. This is sufficient to prevent localized losses due to energy emors.
SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
A collimation at 5 o in the transfer line will be important to protect the LHC injection regions against serious damage and to limit injection oscillations in the LHC. Issues presently under study include e fixed or mobile apertures, e attenuation performance, e exact positioning, e necessity of momentum collimation. In parallel, work leading to a detailed technical design has started.
